All The More Reason

In his valedictory speech to the Labour Party Conference, Tony Blair was effusive in his praise for George Howarth, Janet Anderson and Mike Hall. Why? Because, well…

‘Good ministers, but I asked them to make way.’

Because he had sacked them. The aforementioned ex-ministers must have welcomed the name-check, even if George Howarth might have been left pondering exactly which aspect of his Northern Ireland brief was performed so well as to merit his dismissal. The ministerial reshuffle is a curious sport.

The Prime Minister described their common virtue:

‘They never forgot their principles when in office; and they never discovered them when they left office.’

In plain, and less rhetorically appealing terms, this is to say that they all adhered to the principle of ministerial responsibility. As a member of the government, you must take collective responsibility for government action. If you have a disagreement, you leave your ministerial post, as well as your ministerial car and your ministerial salary (although if dismissed you receive a year’s salary- a safety-net for the ill effects of Prime Ministerial caprice). A minister is politically and morally responsible for the collective decisions of government until he drops out of the collective.

Without wishing to take anything away from Messrs Howarth, Hall and Anderson’s admirable, and constitutionally proper, knack of marching in tight formation towards their own destruction, I rather think that their Field Marshall’s comments were aimed at another target altogether.

With the notable exception of the late Robin Cook, very few Labour Cabinet Ministers have resigned, since 1997, as a result of a fundamental disagreement with government policy. Claire Short made the rather elementary, but surprisingly common, error of resigning in opposition to a policy agreed by a Cabinet of which she was a member. The barb hooked from Blair’s semi-colon was doubtless intended to spike Short after her defection to a whipless no-man’s land.

Peter Hain, deputy leadership ‘hopeful’, is the latest minister to claim that ‘ I never done believed in what I was voting for after all’. Like the superannuated light entertainer, who- did he mention?- ‘does a lot of work for charity’ (did he mention that?), Hain never misses an opportunity to crowbar into the conversation his undoubtedly noble opposition to apartheid in the 1970s. But I wouldn’t want you to think him a monomaniac. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, deputy-leadership-hopeful-Peter-Hain has a view on just about anything you want. So what will it be, comrades? Iraq, you say…?

In an interview with the New Statesman magazine, Hain has criticised American, and by extension, British foreign policy in the Middle East as ‘failed’, whilst offering an unequivocal mea culpa:

“No Labour minister, as I was at the time, can shirk responsibility for it or deny responsibility for it.”.

Unfortunately, he then goes on to do just that; criticising almost every aspect of the policy in Iraq that he had a hand in implementing, except that of the original decision to go to war.

In the absence of a leadership contest, the poll for the deputy leadership post is likely to be the only meaningful opportunity for members of the Labour Party to engage in frank and open debate with key figures about the future of their party. The contenders for this position should be willing to say something interesting and fresh, rather than resorting to the stale rhetoric of the lowest common denominator. With the exception of John Cruddas, all those contesting the post are current members of the Cabinet. We should ensure that their rhetoric matches their record.

To believe that the party has strayed off course and ought to move in a different direction is no crime, but we should always ask ourselves why those who now make a virtue of their strongly held convictions have, up to this point, lacked the courage to express them. In politics, to think is to act.

In the case of Peter Hain, it strikes me as rather uncourageous to employ collective responsibility as a cloak for one’s true views on ‘taking an eye off the ball of Middle East peace’ or an ‘incoherent foreign policy’, particularly when open dissent at the time could have actually made a difference. To crow, after the event, about a ‘failed’ policy you failed to prevent is nothing short of bizarre. But to do so cynically, in furtherance of a bid for political office, is grubby. Forget ‘finding’ your principles after leaving office; anyone who can abandon their principles so readily when in search for office, is probably one to steer clear of.

Michael P

There’s an article by Robert D. Kaplan in Atlantic Monthly which describes the potential fallout of the inevitable collapse of North Korea. There are passages that are so surreal that when read in isolation one risks mild migraines due to the weight of contemplation. For example:

On the Korean peninsula, the Cold War has never ended. On the somber, seaweed-toned border dividing the two Koreas, amid the cries of egrets and Manchurian cranes, I observed South Korean soldiers standing frozen in tae kwon do ready positions, their fists clenched and forearms tightened, staring into the faces of their North Korean counterparts. Each side picks its tallest, most intimidating soldiers for the task (they are still short by American standards).

Quite a lot of impotence in this gesture, I’d say. Here’s another one in a similar vain.

The two sides once held a meeting in Panmunjom that went on for eleven hours. Because there was no formal agreement about when to take a bathroom break, neither side budged. The meeting became known as the “Battle of the Bladders.”

I’m very thankful not to have assisted at that meeting. It’s also worth noting how when dealing with the mad, one goes a little mad too. I’m sure South Korea holds very little bladder busting meetings on their own, but I can’t be so sure about the North. Clearly, the main purpose of Kaplan’s article is not to illustrate the insanity of the regime, but to outline what some of the consequences of its insanity will be. This includes the possible mass migration out of North Korea to both China and South Korea. And that, as opposed to full out war, is one of the better scenarios to hope for.

Naturally, the United States will be expected to do something in this situation. Whatever it does do, it will inevitably be condemned by a certain portion of its population and by the world (and naturally it will be thanked by others). I’m surprised that more noise hasn’t been made by those against the war in Iraq as to what they wish the United States do in this situation. I’ve seen very few editorials on the subject from the “left”, and certainly very little action in terms of bloggers. The only exception to this is the fatuous argument that Bush didn’t invade N. Korea but did invade Iraq. Wouldn’t now be a better time to clamour for something instead of waiting until the regime collapses, when it might be too late for their voices to be heard?

At least for me, the only things that one could humanely argue for in this situation ring remarkably similar to what was argued for in the situation in Iraq. I honestly have no idea what people who argued against the war in Iraq will say when the regime in N. Korea collapses. I’m not holding my whizz waiting to find out.

Jonathan Smith